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LABOR VIOLENCE-THE JUDICIARY'S
REFUSAL TO APPLY THE HOBBS ACT
ROBERT N. WILLIs*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Hobbs Act amendments' to the Anti-Racketeering Act
of 19342 extended the scope of the Anti-Racketeering Act by
prohibiting violence in labor-management relations.' Since its
enactment in 1946, the Hobbs Act has been misinterpreted,
ignored and discounted by the federal courts. This article deals
with the Hobbs Act and the reasons why it is overlooked by the
Department of Justice and the federal courts in cases involving
labor violence.
Violence involving human beings has been a primary concern
of man since the dawn of civilization and is generally abhorred
irrespective of the level of society on which it occurs. Most crimi-
nal laws are designed by legislatures and enforced by law enforce-
ment agencies to prevent or discourage human violence, and the
Hobbs Act unquestionably falls into this category. The Act spe-
cifically proscribes violent conduct in the area of labor relations
pursuant to Congressional mandate that labor violence should be
treated no differently than violence in any other federally pro-
tected area.
Yet despite this mandate, the two entities responsible for
enforcing the provisions of the Act have failed to do so. The
* Member of the Georgia Bar. B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1965, LL.B., Mercer
University, 1968, LL.M., University of Georgia, 1970.
1. 60 Stat. 420 (1946).
2. 48 Stat. 979-80 (1934) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-54 (1970)).
3. Although this law's effect within the labor-management relations area is the sole
concern here, it should be recognized that the Hobbs Act's prohibitions have been applied
in areas foreign to labor-management relations. See United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d
1069 (2d Cir. 1969) (business owners' competition for rubbish business); United States v.
Pranno, 385 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968) (city alderman's
extortion of owner and contractor); United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964) (interstate hijacking); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d
718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964), reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 1010 (1964)
(professional boxing). There are surprisingly few legal periodical articles dealing with the
Hobbs Act. Stem, Prosecutions of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The
Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 SEroN HALL L. Rev. 1 (1971);
Note, Extortion-Federal Criminal Liability for Strike Violence Under the Hobbs Act, 14
B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 1291 (1975); Comment, Labor Faces the Amended Anti-
Racketeering Act, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1030 (1953).
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United States Justice Department has refused to vigorously pro-
secute those individuals involved in labor violence, while the fed-
eral courts have failed to give effect to the purpose to the Act as
envisioned by Congress. The cases will appear in this article4
illustrate the infrequent attempts which the Justice Department
has made to enforce the Act, and, even when an action has been
brought, the reluctance of the courts to apply the Act to labor
violence situations. Several arguments are advanced to explain
why the Act is not enforced and why the judiciary is reluctant to
find Hobbs Act violations. Among these contentions are that
powerful labor union forces have lobbied against the Act's en-
forcement and that the federal courts traditionally have been
timid about becoming involved in labor-management relations.
Despite the existence of a viable and potentially effective
federal law proscribing labor violence, the Hobbs Act remains
obscure and infrequently used. As a result, labor violence contin-
ues and is ineffectively checked by state laws. Given the extent
to which the federal government regulates all other aspects of
labor-managment relations under a myriad of labor laws,5 it is
anomalous that the federal government is virtually inactive in
labor violence situations, where strict and effective control is re-
quired.
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT UNDERLYING THE STATUTE
A. Congress' Vehement Response to United States v. Teamsters
Local 8071
Violence seems to expand most rapidly during periods of
economic hardship. In response to the increased violence which
4. The case decisions cited in this article comprise virtually all of the officially re-
ported cases which have arisen in a labor context since the Hobbs Act was enacted in 1946.
For an idea of the extensiveness of labor violence since 1946, see Stevenson, Labor Violence
-A National Scandal, READER'S DIGEST, July 1973, at 153; Stevenson, The Construction
Unions Declare War, READER'S DIGEST, July 1973, at 79; Stevenson, The Tyranny of
Terrorism in the Building Trades, READER'S DIGEST, June 1973, at 89; Stevenson, Yes,
Construction-Union Terrorism Is Real, READER'S DIGEST, Dec. 1973, at 85; The Atlanta
Constitution, Aug. 23, 1973, § A, at 31, col. 1; The Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 28, 1973, §
A, at 9, col. I.
5. The major federal laws include: The Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-86 (1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-86 (Supp. II, 1972); The Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (Supp. II,
1972); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 2000e-1 to -15 (1970), as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 200e-1 to -16 (Supp. I, 1972); The Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (Supp. II, 1972).
6. 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
[Vol. 28
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occurred during and after the Great Depression, Congress specifi-
cally sought to curb the growth of criminal extortion by passing
the Anti-Racketeering Act in 1934.
7
The Anti-Racketeering Act broadly prohibited extortion
7. The Anti-Racketeering Act, ch. 569, §§ 1-6, 48 Stat. 979 (1934) (current version in
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970)):
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the term "trade or commerce",
as used herein, is defined to mean trade or commerce between any States, with
foreign nations, in the District of Columbia, in any Territory of the United
States, between any such Territory or the District of Columbia and any State
or other Territory, and all other trade or commerce over which the United States
has constitutional jurisdiction.
Sec. 2. Any person who, in connection with or in relations to any act in any
way or in any degree affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity
moving or about to move in trade or commerce-
(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or
threat to use force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other
valuable considerations, or the purchase or rental of property or protec-
tive services, not including, however, the payment of wages by a bona-
fide employer to a bona-fide employee; or
(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right; or
(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or physi-
cal injury to a person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to
violate sections (a) or (b); or
(d) Conspires or acts concertedly with any other person or persons to
commit any of the foregoing acts; shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty
of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment from one to ten years
or by a fine of $10,000, or both.
Sec. 3. (a) As used in this Act the term "wrongful" means in violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or Territory.
(b) The terms "property", "money", or "valuable considerations" used
herein shall not be deemed to include wages paid by a bona-fide employer
to a bona-fide employee.
Sec. 4. Prosecutions under this Act shall be commenced only upon the
express direction of the Attorney General of the United States.
Sec. 5. If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act, and the application
of such provision to other person or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 6. Any person charged with violating this Act may be prosecuted in
any district in which any part of the offense has been committed by him or by
his actual associates participating with him in the offense or by his fellow con-
spirators: Provided, That no court of the United States shall construe or apply
any of the provisions of this Act in such manner as to impair, diminish, or in
any manner affect the rights of bona-fide labor organizations in lawfully carry-
ing out the legitimate objects thereof, as such rights are expressed in existing
statutes of the United States.
Id. (emphasis in original).
To provide a point of reference in the history of labor relations legislation, it is noted
that the Anti-Racketeering Act preceded by a year the Wagner Act-the first major
federal labor statute.
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through the use or threatened use of violence. Yet the Act was
inapplicable to violent conduct in an employment relationship,
and Congress was careful to direct the federal courts not to "im-
pair or diminish, or in any manner affect the rights of bona fide
labor organizations in carrying out the legitimate objectives '" of
such organizations. The effect of this exclusion was to protect
labor unions from federal criminal prosecution during the period
of intense industrial strife which followed the Depression. But
the full extent of the protection accorded unions by the excep-
tions of the Anti-Racketeering Act was not fully realized until
1942 when the union abuses not prohibited by the Act were
clearly illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Teamster Local 807.1
In Local 807 a New York federal district court convicted the
defendants of conspiracy to violate the Anti-Racketeering Act of
1934.'" Specifically, the Local was found guilty of coercing money
from out-of-state truck drivers who did not belong to Teamsters
Local 807. When nonunion drivers attempted to enter New York
City, Local 807 members intercepted the drivers and, through use
or threats of violence, exacted money payments as a prerequisite
to entering the city." On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the
convictions and both parties petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari. Upon hearing the case, the Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he question in the case concerns that portion of § 2(a) which
exempts from punishment any person who 'obtains or attempts
to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to use force,
violence, or coercion, * * * the payment of wages by a bonafide
employer to a bonafide employee' "; and whether the activities of
Local 807 in this situation were entitled to that exclusion.'
2
Examining the legislative history in order to resolve this
issue, the Court found that, following passage of Senate Bill 2248
(which later became the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934), the
American Federation of Labor (AFL) vigorously lobbied against
application of the bill to labor. As a result of AFL lobbying ef-
8. The Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, ch. 569, § 6, 49 Stat. 979 (1934).
9. 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
10. Id. at 524-25.
11. The Court recognized that "these amounts were the regular union rates for a day's
work of driving and unloading . . . and in several cases the jury could have found that
these defendants either failed to offer to work, or refused to work for the money when asked
to do so."
12. Id. at 527.
[Vol. 28
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forts, two amendments were added: the exception relating to the
payment of wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide em-
ployee, and the protective proviso in section 6 of the Act preserv-
ing the "legitimate" rights of bona fide labor organizations. The
Court noted that the amended bill was passed by both the House
and the Senate without debate after it was disclosed that the bill,
as amended, had the full approval and support of organized
labor. 3
In further recognition that Congress did not intend for the
Anti-Racketeering Act to apply to labor, the Court held that the
bona fide employer/employee exemption was not to be restricted
to a defendant who already had the status of bona fide employee.
The exemption extended to a person outside of the traditional
employment relationship, but who was seeking to enter such a
relationship, even though such person might fail in this attempt. 4
Although an attempt to enter into a "bona fide" employment
relationship might be accompanied by violence, such a situation,
though unfortunate, was not prohibited by the Anti-Racketeering
Act.
The Government argued that for purposes of evaluating the
required elements of intent and motive necessary for conviction,
it was necessary to look toward the truck drivers/owners. But the
Court disagreed, stating that it was the defendants' intent, mo-
tive, and purpose that needed to be analyzed to determine
whether the objective of the defendants fell within the labor im-
munity exception of § 2(a). 15 The Court's holding virtually elimi-
13. Id. at 530. In the opinion of the Court's majority, these amendments effectively
carved out labor's "legitimate objectives" exemption from the Anti-Racketeering Act:
[The legislative proceedings] contain clear declarations by the head of the
Department which drafted the section and by the sponsor of the bill in Congress,
first, that the elimination of terroristic activities by professional gangsters was
the aim of the statute, and second, that no interference with traditional labor
union activities was intended.
Id.
14. Id. at 531.
15. The Court examined the jury instructions as delivered by the trial judge and
determined that they generally followed the Government's contentions, which the Court
had concluded were unsupported by the Act. The jury had been instructed to examine
the defendants' guilt on the basis of the motive or intent of the truck drivers/owners. The
Court stated that these instructions were not correct because they created a situation
where a determination of "[wihether or not the defendants were guilty of conspiracy...
became contingent upon the purposes of others and not upon their own aims and objec-
tives." Id. at 537. Under the standard found by the Court to be proper
the jury was bound to acquit the defendants if it found that their objective and
purpose was to obtain by the use of threat of violence the chance to work for
1976]
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nated any argument that labor unions were subject to the pros-
criptions of the Anti-Racketeering Act.' The decision thus ended
any hope the Act could be used to check the proliferation of union
racketeering and violence.
The Court further determined that no conspiracy existed
when the defendant's purpose was to perform services for the
money demanded of the non-union drivers. The Court did note,
though, that criminal conspiracy would have been committed in
violation of the Act had the defendant intended to obtain money
through the use of violence without performing any work. Despite
evidence that work in fact was not tendered for the payments
demanded,'" the Court concluded that the defendants were pro-
tected by the § 2(a) exception insomuch as they offered their
services in good faith for the payments, although the services
offered were rejected. The Court ultimately based their holding
on the legislative history underlying the Act, noting that the Con-
gress had not intended to prohibit or affect the ordinary activities
of labor unions. Moreover, the Court pointed out that although
federal law was inapplicable to the conduct of the union, state law
proscribed the violent conduct of the sort engaged in by the defen-
dants.'8
Reaction to the Local 807 decision was immediate and vehe-
ment. Congress was outraged by the opinion of the Court, 9 as was
the public at large. Soon thereafter Congress undertook to correct
the precedent created by the Court.
the money, but to accept the money even if the employers refused to permit
them to work.
Id.at 538. Using this standard, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit.
16. Dissenting, Chief Justice Stone stated that this Act's labor exemption was to be
construed narrowly, rather than broadly, as determined by the majority. The dissent
agreed with the approach of the Government, accepting the argument that the jury should
determine intention, motive, purpose, and objective from the truck drivers/owners'
perspective, and should not, as the majority found, use the defendants' "willingness to
work [as] the test of guilt, regardless of the intended natural effect of the violence on
the victims in compelling them to pay the money, not as wages but in order to secure
immunity from assault." Id. at 543.
17. See note 11 supra.
18. This judicial deference to state laws has provided a convenient rationalization for
not applying federal labor statutes (in this case the Anti-Racketeering Act) to a given
situation.
19. There are numerous accounts of angry reactions by congressmen to the Local 807
decision. See, e.g., 89 CoNG. REc. 3210-11 (1943) (remarks of Representative Hancock);
Id. at 3212 (remarks of Representative Springer).
[Vol. 28
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B. The Hobbs Act Amendment to the Anti-Racketeering Act of
1934 and Congressional Exclusion of Violence as a "Legitimate
Labor Activity"
After detailed review and study by the House Committee on
the Judiciary,' the House of Representatives focused its atten-
tion in 1943 upon an amendment to the 1934 Anti-Racketeering
Act offered by Representative Hobbs. It was clear at the outset
of the House debates that there was less than unanimous accept-
ance of Hobbs' proposed amendment, as reported out by the Ju-
diciary Committee. The opposition to the reported amendment
is exemplified by an alternative amendment offered by Repre-
sentative Celler of New York and the debates between Hobbs
and Celler concerning their respective amendments. One such
exchange regarding Celler's proposal illustrates the difference of
opinion over the proper form of the amendment:
Mr. CELLER. . . . The difference between my amend-
ment and the committee amendment is this: The committee
amendment simply states that the so-called Hobbs bill in its
entirety shall not modify or repeal the so-called Railway Labor
Act, the Clayton Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, or the National
Labor Relations Act. You might well just say that the Hobbs
bill does not affect or repeal the National Tariff Act, or it does
not affect or repeal the White Slave Act or the Income Tax Act.
My amendment embraces within the purview of the Hobbs
bill all lawful acts and activities and conduct of trade-unions
that have been made lawful under these four enumerated acts.
It would preserve all legitimate labor activities. It would not
place any approval upon racketeering or robbery or extortion or
any conduct that the local teamsters' union was guilty of in New
York City.
Mr. HOBBS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, almost any crime may be committed while
the perpetrator is engaged in otherwise lawful acts, conduct or
activities.
Therein is the trick or joker in the Celler Amendment.
Honestly and peaceably seeking employment is not only
lawful, but commendable. However, it is equally lawful for the
one from who employment is sought to refuse it. Does any sane
20. H. R. REP. No. 653, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
19761
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and reasonable man contend that the lawful right honestly and
peaceably to seek employment gives the seeker the right to force
employment or to beat the refuser.
The Celler amendment says "No acts, conduct, or activities
which are lawful under" the four major labor relations
laws-Clayton Antitrust Act, Norris-LaGuardia Act, Railway
Labor Act, and National Labor Relations Act-"shall consti-
tute a violation of this Act." It wholly omits to require, as do
these acts to which it refers, that the "acts, conduct or activi-
ties which are lawful" must be done lawfully and peacefully,
and that no crime be committed while doing otherwise lawful
acts.
The committee amendment refers to the same four major
labor relations laws and guarantees, as does the bill without the
amendment, every right granted in them; but it does not grant
the right to do a lawful act, in an unlawful way, nor the right to
commit crime under color of legality.
Why does labor now seek to make itself above the law that
applies to all others? Is there any reason why labor should be
granted immunity from the penalties of the criminal law? Un-
less crime be committed, no one can be hurt by any criminal
law. "The guilty flee when no man pursueth." If labor is inno-
cent, how can this bill hurt them? If guilty, why should they be
the only class seeking immunity?
I submit that for these reasons the Celler amendment is
dangerous, especially in view of the decision in the Local 807
case, which held that no matter how much violence might ac-
company a request for employment it was all right and you are
perfectly innocent under the antiracketeering law. The same
thing is true here. No matter what may be said about the Celler
amendment, it still does not require, as do the acts to which it
points, that lawful acts, conduct, or activities must be done in
a lawful and peaceful way. Without that or something like that
the amendment should be defeated."
The foregoing statements by these two Congressmen clearly
define the battle lines that were drawn in the House debates in
1943. Representative Celler was the main spokesman for organ-
ized labor in the House during these debates. It is quite evident
in reviewing the Congressional Record that the debates were both
21. 89 CONG. REC. 3220-21 (1943).
[Vol. 28
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extended and vigorous, and that feelings for and against these
amendments ran high.2
Making little attempt to disguise their disgust with the Su-
preme Court's Local 807 decision, every Congressman, whether
22. Speaking on behalf of organized labor against the Hobbs amendments as reported
from the Judiciary Committee, Representative Sadowski of Michigan launched the follow-
ing attack:
The trouble with the Hobbs bill is that it can be construed by the courts to
prohibit and punish most of the legitimate activities of organized labor ...
Whatever the proponents of the proposed measure may say, the language of the
Hobbs bill is so broad that it constitutes a serious menace to all that organized
labor has struggled for, bled for, and even died for through many decades.
The Hobbs bill is a bad bill. It is a vicious bill. If passed, it would pave the
way for the destruction of organized American labor. Let us not fool ourselves.
Success of bills like the Hobbs measure will pave the way for facism in America
in exactly the same way Hitler fastened the bloody tentacles of facism upon the
unhappy people of Europe.
Id. at 3207-08.
Representative Baldwin of New York opposed the bill in the belief that it would
restrict production necessary to meet wartime needs:
This bill, whether amended or not, does only one thing. It unjustly points
the finger of congressional suspicion at American organized labor, a group in our
country which has within itself corrected the evils complained of, and which in
my opinion has contributed as much as any other group in the community to
the successful prosecution of the war. I earnestly hope this bill will be defeated.
Id. at 3219.
Another congressman considered the Celler amendment a complete emasculation of
the Hobbs Act. Representative Baldwin of Maryland explained:
For the information of some of you gentleman [sic] who were not present awhile
back I will make the statement that the Maryland delegation had a meeting
with the Maryland C.I.O. leaders, about 200 of them, 2 or 3 weeks ago. This
Hobbs bill came up for discussion. They were opposed to it unless the Celler
amendment was accepted and when asked directly why they would accept it
with the Celler amendment, they very frankly said because it nullified the
[Hobbs] bill and the bill with that amendment meant nothing. They probably
had very good legal advice on that question.
Id. at 3224. Representative Hancock of New York, one of the strongest proponents for the
passage of the Hobbs Act, with the Committee's amendment recognizing the existing
labor laws' protection for legitimate labor activities, presented a concise and excellent
characterization of the Celler amendment.
S. .[T]he Celler amendment is adroit and tricky. There is more to it than
meets the eye. It provides that no act which is lawful under the various labor
statutes which are specified shall constitute a violation of this act. Everyone
concedes it is lawful to seek jobs. Under the Byrnes decision [Teamsters Local
807, supra] it is lawful to use any amount of violence necessary to obtain
employment, and by using force to obtain employment a man may establish a
bona fide relationship of employer and employee. If the Celler amendment is
adopted, it can be argued that Congress intends to exempt the very offenses we
all know this amendment is designed to reach.
89 CONG. REC. 3210 (1943).
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speaking for or against the Celler or Committee amendments,
demanded that the Local 807 decision be reversed by legislative
action. Furthermore, it is evident from these House debates that
the direct thrust was toward abolishing labor violence by making
it a federal crime.
During the floor debates, the Congress addressed vitally im-
portant issues which still plague the courts interpreting the
Hobbs Act. In fact, the courts often ignore the legislative history
of the Act when interpreting the statute, even in cases where such
history would aid in the disposition of questions confronting the
courts. This is particularly evinced by the courts' reluctant appli-
cation of the federal act to labor violence situations. Rather than
applying federal law to these situations, it has been believed that
state law is available to deal with labor violence. The courts
accordingly have elected to defer to state courts in these matters.
Yet clearly Congress specifically debated the federal/state dichot-
omy issue and proper analysis would dictate that the courts turn
to the legislative history in deciding whether state or federal law
applied to labor violence. Had the courts done so, they would
have discovered that the legislative history provided a rather con-
clusive answer to just this question." This issue is only one exam-
ple of judicial refusal to recognize clear legislative intent. To
understand the impetus behind the legislation, the Congressional
history must be more closely examined.
During debate, Representative Hobbs recognized that the
several states had laws which condemn and punish robbery, ex-
tortion and the use of violence in accomplishing unlawful objec-
tives. Yet Hobbs further noted that Congress would neglect its
constitutional duty "to protect interstate and foreign commerce
from unlawful interference" 24 if it chose to "pass the buck" by
deferring to state law in the area of labor-management relations.
Hobbs expressly concluded that "the States' rights argument is
just another smoke screen '2 5 and contended that the federal law
under consideration should apply to situations involving labor
violence. Representatives Gwynne of Iowa and Nichols of Okla-
homa supported Hobbs' stand on this issue by recognizing the
ineffective enforcement of state criminal laws in areas of labor
23. Id. at 3217-18 (remarks of Representative Hobbs).
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activity.26 They cited the Local 807 case to support their argu-
ment, noting that the truck drivers/owners in the Local 807 case
had futilely tried to solicit the protection of the New York police:
Mr. GWYNNE. They told us in the hearings before the
subcommittee that they had complained and complained to the
local authorities, but that nothing was done and that was why
they went to the Federal law.Y
Mr. NICHOLS ... But they have a police department
and policemen in the great State of New York where the high-
jacking complained of took place that caused this bill to be
brought to the floor, but they did not do anything about it.
Who is the man who would say that simply because there
is a State law there should not be a Federal law against the same
thing to protect men and goods that move in interstate com-
merce? That is no argument; no.2
After exhaustive consideration of the Hobbs bill and the
Committee and Celler amendments, the House overwhelmingly
passed the Act, as amended by the Committee amendment. 29 The
passage of the Act was a crushing defeat for those members of the
Congress who were proponents of the interests of labor. But more
importantly, the enactment of the statute indicated that the in-
tent of Congress was to allow the federal anti-racketeering law to
apply broadly in the area of labor relations. It is clear that the
26. Today two factors have an even greater impact on this point: the federal pre-
emption doctrine and the organized labor lobby. The boundaries of the preemption doc-
trine and its concomitant effect on state law is an unsettled matter. There is little predict-
ability as to the jurisdiction which state courts may exercise over labor related suits. In
fact, state courts or other labor law enforcement agencies are often confused as to the
extent of their jurisdiction in light of the preemption doctrine.
Moreover, the labor lobby has an apparent effect on the enforcement of state labor
laws. The laxity in enforcement of state law varies directly in proportion to the effective-
ness of lobbying activities by organized labor. In 1943 fear of this influence was manifested
in Congress. There was concern that the varying effect of the lobby in different states
might cause nonuniform enforcement of even the federal law. Representative LaFollette
of Indiana attempted to avoid this potential conflict by introducing an amendment which
would have required United States attorneys to obtain the approval of the United States
Attorney General before initiating prosecutions under the Hobbs Act. See id. at 3227.
Today, a central federal authority, the United States Department of Justice, Management
and Labor Division, reviews possible Hobbs Act violations, often upon referral by United
States attorneys. See Tannin, Tannin Discusses Need for Control of Unions, VA. L.
WEEKLY, Dec. 14, 1973.
27. 89 CONG. Rec. 3219 (1943) (remarks of Representative Gwynne).
28. Id. at 3224 (remarks of Representative Nichols).
29. See id. at 3229-30.
1976]
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intent of Congress was to proscribe labor activities involving viol-
ence and other criminally unlawful labor tactics, whether or not
they occurred in the pursuit of "legitimate objectives" allowed
under the federal labor relations laws.
30
For some reason, unexplained in the Congressional Record,
no further action was taken by Congress on the Hobbs Bill follow-
ing its passage by the House of Representatives in 1943.31 It was
next brought before the House of Representatives in 1945 as
House Resolution 32. Review of this latter, and less significant
portion of the Act's legislative history32 confirms that from the
standpoint of the House, there had been no change in legislative
attitude and that the legislative intent manifested by the 1943
bill was no different than the intention behind the final enact-
ment of the bill in 1945.11
30. Representative Jennings of Tennessee concisely summarized the congressional
intent by stating:
I can tell you how every citizen, every man, woman, and child in this
country, can avoid the penalties of this act and that is to refrain from interfer-
ence with interstate commerce through acts of violence and illegal conduct such
as are denounced by this bill. This measure will not suspend, impair, or destroy
any of the protection thrown around labor by the laws passed by Congress. It
so provides in no uncertain terms.
Id. at 3211.
31. Representative Bradley of Michigan expressed his concern over this inaction in
the following remarks:
(lit seems to me that anyone, be he a member of a union or the president of a
union, who would disapprove of the enactment of this legislation automatically
places himself on record as condoning racketeering, coercion, and violence to
personal property. I do not. And it has been shown, Mr. Speaker, twice before
since I have been a Member of this body that the vast majority of this House
does not condone it, either, because we in this House have passed this same bill
on two separate occasions at least. Why it has been permitted to die in the
Senate is beyond reasonable comprehension.
91 CONG. REC. 11845 (1945). See also id. at 11906 (remarks of Representative Robinson).
32. For this second phase of the Act's legislative history, see id. at 11839-48, 11899-
922.
33. Representative Walter of Pennsylvania remarked during consideration of the bill
that Congress was vitally concerned with the legislation. He stated:
[I] am firmly convinced that if the workers of this Nation knew what the
problem was, to a man they would be for this legislation.
Now let us look to the need for it. I do not know whether any committee
ever held any more extensive hearings than our committee [of the Judiciary]
held on this measure. The hearings consist of 429 pages. Of course, we did not
hold any this year. This is not unusual because the problem is the same as it
was when the legislation was first introduced.
Id. at 11841. It was further noted that the 1945 Congress differed in membership from the
1943 Congress. To an extent, different considerations were dealt with by each Congress.
Id. at 11846 (remarks of Rep. Sabath). As will be later developed, one of the problems
12
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Once again, in 1945, the House of Representatives resolved
itself into the Committee of the Whole for consideration of H.R.
32.31 Immediately following this House resolution, Representative
Celler of New York again loudly derided the Hobbs Act and its
contemplated effects on organized labor and organized labor's
activities. For a second time, he argued vigorously that passage
of the Hobbs Act would greatly curtail legitimate labor activi-
ties. " One of the most pertinent exchanges in the debates relating
to the issue of the Act's scope clearly illustrates the intent of
Congress to broadly apply the Act's provisions and provides a
basis for Representative Celler's objections. The exchange in
question was between Representatives Doyle and Hancock:
Mr. DOYLE. I call the gentleman's attention to section 6
of the committee's report, the proviso. I understand the commit-
tee claims that this bill will only apply to the illegitimate or law-
breaking activities of any person, including labor unions. If that
be true, why did the committee strike out the proviso in the
present law and leave it out? May I have an answer to that
question? Why was it striken out?
with judicial interpretation of the intent behind the Act is the failure to clearly recognize
the interrelationship of two histories. States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973), was almost
entirely based on the 1945 legislative history. Id. at 404, n. 14. While it is most frequently
argued that the 1945 history alters 1943 considerations, this is probably not true. The bill
was eventually passed in 1945 without any amendments, other than those approved in
1943. Furthermore, the Act's passage occurred after the availability of the Judiciary Com-
mittee's hearing materials and it can be asserted that the Congress in 1945 acted after
considering the same facts and issues which prompted unqualified passage of the bill in
1943.
34. 91 CONG. REc. 11899 (1945).
35. Representative Celler warned against the Act's applicability to labor violence:
Attorneys familiar with the decisions of the courts on charge of "violence"
in labor relations can tell of the implications to labor in a statute worded as is
the instant bill. There are courts which, in injunction cases have held name-
calling or use of such terms as "scab" to constitute "force" or "violence". What-
ever may be your views as to whether such name-calling should properly be
considered disorderly conduct under local ordinances or statutes, it should be
kept in mind that the pending bill is defining conduct which would become a
felony, punishable by imprisonment up to 20 years, or by a fine of up to $10,000
or both.
[A]nd truly criminal conduct which may occur in the course of these
altercations and scuffles is of course punishable by local disorderly conduct
statutes or ordinances or other local laws. Under the Hobbs bill every such
altercation is automatically raised to the level of a Federal offense - a Federal
felony the punishment for which may be as high as 20 years in jail or a $10,000
in fine.
Id. at 11901. Even with these clear warnings, the Act was overwhelmingly passed. There-
fore it is reasonable to conclude that the Act would apply to a wide range of labor disorder,
even at the cost of usurping the jurisdiction of the states to deal with the same conduct.
13
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Mr. HANCOCK. What proviso is that, may I ask the
gentleman?
Mr. DOYLE. The proviso, which reads:
That no court of the United States shall construe or apply
any of the provisions of this act in such manner as to im-
pair, diminish, or in any manner affect the rights of bona
fide labor organizations in lawfully carrying out the legiti-
mate objects thereof, as such rights are expressed in exist-
ing statutes of the United States.
Mr. HANCOCK. We thought it would better safeguard
the statutes which the various labor people are interested in,
namely, the Clayton Act, Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Railway
Labor Act, and the Fair Labor Practices Act. We are explicit.
That language is too general, and we thought it better to make
this bill explicit, and leave nothing to the imagination of the
court.36
In the closing pages of the Act's legislative history, shortly
before House passage of the Hobbs Bill for a second time, there
was yet another flurry of proposed amendment activity. The
amendments were offered by Representative Celler on behalf of
organized labor. 7 The House membership rejected all of these
proposed amendments and the Hobbs Act eventually was passed
exactly as it had been initially reported to and amended by the
House in 1943.35 On June 18, 1946 the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee reported to the Senate39 a favorable recommendation of "do
36. Id. at 11904. The labor laws referred to by Representative Hancock afforded little
protection against labor violence, as was specifically pointed out by several House mem-
bers throughout the Act's legislative history. See id. at 11918 (remarks of Representative
Baldwin); id. at 11912 (remarks of Representative Hobbs); 89 CONG. REC. at 3201-02
(remarks of Representative Gwynne).
37. For the text of these amendments, see 91 CONG. REC. 11913-14 (1945) (remarks of
Representative Celler).
38. Since the Act was not amended by the Senate, it was reported by the House in
its final form. This is the same form in which the Act appears today. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951
(1970).
39. The bill was moved expeditiously through the Senate, which was probably aware
of the House members' expectations. These expectations were indicated by Representative
Rivers' remarks:
This is the third trip this bill is making to the body at the other end of the
Capitol. I hope that on this occasion, when we pass this bill with a resounding
majority, our colleagues on the other side will sense the righteous cause with
which the framers of this Nation are armed, and say to racketeers everywhere
"that no longer will they intimidate and coerce the weak; no longer will they
obstruct and retard, or attempt to obstruct or retard, the orderly transportation
of persons and property in interstate or foreign commerce; we, too, are deter-
[Vol. 28
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pass" on H.R. 32.40 The Senate easily passed H.R. 32"' and Presi-
dent Truman approved the law on July 3, 1946.42
III. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOBBS ACT
A. Foreward
Once President Truman's signature was affixed to the Hobbs
Act, the legislative process ended. After passage of the Act, it
became the responsibility of the judiciary to interpret and refine
the effect of the legislation. It soon became evident that these
judicial interpretations would emasculate at least some of the
congressional intent underlying the Act. The case analysis43
which comprises the following portion of this article illustrates
the manner in which the courts have historically refused to sub-
ject violence in the labor relations context to the strictures of the
Hobbs Act.
B. Problems in Effectuating Congressional Intent
An early Hobbs Act case, United States v. Kemble,11 is an
interesting study of the problems the courts had in interpreting
the Hobbs Act to give effect to congressional intent, in light of the
attitude in the judiciary not to prohibit labor violence through
enforcement of federal law. In Kemble, the defendant union
member was convicted under the Hobbs Act for threatening a
nonunion truck driver in an attempt to force the driver to hire a
union member to perform unnecessary work. The Third Circuit
affirmed the conviction by stating that it was "inescapable that
Congress intended that the language used in the 1946 statute be
broad enough to include, in proper cases, the forced payment of
mined to be on the side of law and order.
91 CONG. REC. 11917 (1945).
40. S. REP. No. 1516, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1946).
41. - CONG REC. _ .
42. In his message to Congress upon approval of the Hobbs Act, President Truman
acknowledge that he had been advised by the Attorney General that as long as the activi-
ties of labor were "legitimate and peaceful" then the Act would not be applied to such
activities. Id. at 8299.
43. Rather than chronologically trace the entire case law which has developed since
1946, only the cases most significant to the arguments presented in this article are exam-
ined in detail.
44. 198 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 893 (1952). Two significant pre-
Hobbs Act cases which are most often cited in post-Hobbs Act cases are United States v.
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wages."4 However, the court intended to limit the effect of the
decision. Instead of holding that an attempt to obtain money for
unnecessary, unwanted and superfluous services through the use
of violence was an obstruction of commerce,4" the majority dec-
lined to extend thelr "inescapable conclusion" beyond Kemble's
specific conduct at issue in the case.
Notwithstanding the majority's reluctance to broadly pro-
scribe conduct obviously in violation of the Act, the dissenting
opinions of Judges McLaughlin and Staley even more lucidly
illustrate judicial refusal to give effect to the intended scope of
the statute. Judge McLaughlin expressly asserted that the con-
duct in the Kemble case was not in violation of the statute. He
stated:
We are dealing with a problem peculiar to labor. . . . It arose
from a reputable union's genuine attempt to organize a trucking
corporation. The sole purpose of the defendants was to procure
work for capable union men . . . . The Hobbs Act as it stands
is obviously a general federal criminal statute directed to a cer-
tain class of crimes known as racketeering. . . . Its purpose is
clear. . . . It does not include the bona fide seeking of employ-
ment on behalf of a union despite possible violence in connec-
tion therewith."
Judge Staley discounted the contention that the intent of Con-
gress was to deal with labor violence through the Hobbs Act by
explaining that the Act's impact on labor violence was a minor
consideration. He then went on to state that such violence then
was not within the Act's proscriptions, thus rendering the Act
inapplicable to the case:
The fact that physical violence was threatened should not be
allowed to confuse the picture. If Congress had enacted legisla-
45. 198 F.2d at 891.
46. Eventually such conduct was held by the Supreme Court to be an obstruction of
commerce in United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956). See notes 54-59 and accompany-
ing text infra.
47. 198 F.2d at 895-96. Judge McLaughlin objected to the majority opinion as being
broader than his own:
The majority opinion flatly states that because there was evidence of violence
and threats and because the 1946 law does not contain the exception that ap-
peared in the 1934 Act regarding payment of wages by a bona fide employer to
a bona fide employee, Kemble is guilty under the Hobbs Act indictment against
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tion making the obstruction of commerce by violence or threats
of violence a crime, these defendants would properly stand con-
victed. But no such offenses were even made into law; and this
court should not judicially legislate these offenses."
In a concurrring opinion, Chief Judge Biggs most accurately
interpreted the Act in light of its legislative history, by recogniz-
ing that
[t]he 1946 Act was intended by Congress to apply to every
individual whether he was acting on behalf of a labor union or
not if commerce was obstructed by his use of violence or threats
of violence .... 11
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Staley expressed the fear
that the majority opinion and the precedent it established, would
be used to curb labor violence throughout a wide range of labor
activities." Unfortunately, Staley's fears were not realized. In-
stead the courts in subsequent decisions only narrowly applied
the precedent of the Kemble case.
C. Reluctant Judicial Application of the Hobbs Act
Proscriptions
A survey of the cases decided since enactment of the Hobbs
Act in 1946 presents two clearly distinctive types of situations
48. Id. at 899. Staley clearly ignores the legislative history of the Act by stating:
When we cast aside this second requisite [of felonious intent], as does the
majority, we, in effect, amend the statute before us from one designed to punish
extortion and robbery affecting commerce to one punishing violence or threats
of violence affecting commerce. This task is obviously for Congress - not the
courts.
Id.
49. Id. at 902.
50. Judge Staley forecast:
The construction here adopted by the majority will have far-reaching effects on
the rights of organized labor. A strike designed to force an employer to pay
higher wages or employ additional workers is obviously designed to obtain
money from the employer, even though the underlying intent can hardly be
considered corrupt. Any sporadic outbreak of violence or threats of violence in
connection with such strike might now be considered a violation of the Hobbs
Act so long as interstate commerce is affected. A trifling assault thus becomes
a serious felony punishable by imprisonment up to twenty years.
Id. at 899.
Judge Staley lightly treated labor violence, by characterinzing it as a "trifling as-
sault." This characterization is indicative of the attitude toward labor violence presently
within the entire judiciary. There exists no plausible explanation for this approach in the
face of traditional criminal statutes prohibiting violence in all other sectors.
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which arguably present Hobbs Act questions. The first of these
distinctive situations are the archetypal Hobbs Act viola-
tions-the "money extortion" incidents. These cases usually
present clear evidence of extortion, or attempted extortion, of
money or other value from an employer for the benefit of a union
member (usually the union business agent). Because these situa-
tions are so closely similar to criminal conduct, they are easily
recognized and presented, and therefore constitute the bulk of all
Hobbs Act cases.
The other category of cases, termed "labor extortion" cases,
are more difficult to recognize and prove. These cases involved
situations where the union forces or attempts to force an employer
to hire employees which are unneeded and unwanted. Ironically,
although fewer of these cases have confronted the courts as Hobbs
Act violations, as a practical matter these sorts of situations more
commonly arise.
The next two subsections of this article illustrate the judicial
handling of situations in the two aforementioned categories. The
last section of the article deals with the final requisite to a Hobbs
Act violation-employer fear of labor violence.
(1.) Monetary Extortion
Several cases involving the extortion of nonwage money have
occurred in the construction industry.5' An illustrative case is
United States v. Iozzi.51 In the lozzi case, the defendant was presi-
51. One can only speculate about the ratio of monetary extortion cases in the con-
struction as opposed to the non-construction environment. For examples of non-
construction cases which present the classic monetary extortion elements, see, United
States v. Tolub, 309 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1962) (clothing shops) and United States v. Postma,
242 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1957) (trucking). An interesting point in the Postma case is worth
mentioning. In this case a member of the management of the business which was damaged
was convicted of criminal conspiracy to violate the Act. This defendant functioned as the
middleman between the extorted truckers and the extortionist union negotiator. It must
be assumed that the court determined that the extortion of $10,000 from the truckers alone
was the key element in sustaining these Hobbs Act convictions. It is also noteworthy that
these violations arose in the context of a lawful strike to aid and enforce bargaining
demands by the union. See also United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1964)
(trucking).
52. 420 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1970). Other significant construction cases include: United
States v. Stubbs, 476 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Kramer, 355 F.2d 891 (7th
Cir, 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 384 U.S. 100 (1966); United States v. Stirone, 311 F.2d
277 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v. Palmiotti, 254 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1958); Bianchi v.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss2/3
19761 LABOR VIOLENCE
dent of the Baltimore Building and Construction Trade Council.
It was alleged that the defendant used his position in violation of
the Hobbs Act to extort about $10,000 in cash from one construc-
tion company and demanded, but never received, $20,000 from
another. The defendant stated that the work stoppages and pick-
eting he had ordered on these contractors' jobs, and which oc-
cured coincidentally with the demands, had "nothing to do with
his demands for the money, but, on the contrary, were designed
to persuade the contractors to sign a new building trades' agree-
ment."53 The court noted that this "nice distinction" was never
disclosed to these contractors, and the contractors naturally be-
lieved that their labor difficulties, the defendant's cash demands,
and his insistence upon the contractor's acceptance of the new
labor agreement were inseparable. Iozzi was also accused of using
a local business manager of an electrical workers union to negoti-
ate and make the demands for payment from another contractor.
The scope of coverage over commerce and the proper standards of appellate review
were established in the Hulahan decision. In response to Hulahan's objection to federal
jurisdiction over his conduct, the court replied:
We have no doubt that Congress has the power to deal with extortion or at-
tempted extortion actually or potentially affecting interstate commerce, just as
it has power to deal with unfair labor practices so affecting interstate commerce.
214 F.2d at 445. It is interesting to note the court's approval of Congress' exercise of the
federal police power upon those activities "potentially" affecting commerce:
It seems apparent from the language of the statute that it was the intent of
Congress to protect interstate commerce against extortion or attempted extor-
tion which in any way or in any degree reasonably could be regarded as affecting
such commerce. The exaction of tribute from contractors engaged in local con-
struction work who are dependent upon interstate commerce for materials,
equipment and supplies, or who are engaged in constructing facilities to serve
such commerce, is, in our opinion, proscribed by the statute in suit.
Id. This court's statement of "affecting commerce" reconfirmed that the federal govern-
ment's commerce power is virtually unlimited and that currently there are few things
sufficiently local in nature to escape federal jurisdiction.
The standard of review of Hobbs Act convictions was established early in the Hulahan
opinion. The court stated:
It is elementary that in reviewing the question of the adequacy of the evidentiary
basis for a verdict of guilty, this Court must take that view of the evidence which
is most favorable to the Government and give to the Government the benefit of
all inferences which reasonably can be drawn from such evidence. .. .This is
saying no more than that a jury verdict, whether factually right or wrong, is
conclusive upon this Court if sustained by substantial evidence or by permissi-
ble inference drawn therefrom . . . . With the credibility of witnesses or weight
of evidence this Court can have no concern . . . .A lawful conviction under a
single count of the indictment in this case will sustain the judgment appealed
from.
Id. at 442-43.
53. United States v. Iozzi, 420 F.2d 512, 514 (4th Cir. 1970).
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That contractor had testified that the business manager "repre-
sented that he was acting for Iozzi, and that unless payment was
received, the Mafia, with whom he said Iozzi was linked, would
sabotage the job."54 On the basis of these facts the court found
that the defendant's "conduct [had] transgressed the bounds of
legitimate labor tactics . . . ."- In addition, the court went on
to hold that "obtaining money through the fear of economic in-
jury induced by threats of violence or force constitutes extortion
under the Act."56 The court accordingly affirmed the district
court's conviction of Iozzi for Hobbs Act violations.
The Iozzi case is typical of "monetary extortion" cases. It
demonstrates that the essential elements of monetary extortion
are relatively easy to prove. "Labor extortion" situations, which
occur more subtly, are not so easily proved as the monetary extor-
tion violations.
(2.) Labor Extortion
The case claimed to be the most important in the labor extor-
tion category is United States v. Green.7 The defendants in
Green were indicted for attempting to extort, from a construction
contractor, "wages to be paid for imposed, unwanted, superfluous
and fictitious services of laborers."58 The defendants challenged
the indictment, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction over
the case because the activity charged in the indictment was not
within the purview of the Hobbs Act. The Supreme Court re-
jected this argument by recognizing that the Hobbs Act amend-
ments to the Anti-Racketeering Act brought conduct within the
employer-employee relationship under the proscriptions of the
federal law. Furthermore, the Court noted that the defendant's
violent activity 9 was not legitimate labor activity protected by
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 515.
57. 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
58. Id. at 417.
59. The Court recounted the facts of the case which were pertinent to determination
of the jurisdictional issue:
The extortions alleged consisted of attempts to obtain from the particular em-
ployer "his money, in the form of wages to be paid for imposed, unwanted,
superfluous and fictitious services of laborers commonly known as swampers, in
connection with the operation of machinery and equipment then being used and
operated by said [employer] in the execution of his said contract for mainte-
nance work on said levee, the attempted obtaining of said property from said
[Vol. 28
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any of the four labor laws and thus was not exempted by the
Hobbs Act exceptions." On remand, the District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois held that actual violence was not a
necessary element of a Hobbs Act crime.' In fact, the district
court noted that the communication of a threat, without more,
was sufficient to violate the Hobbs Act proscriptions.
6 2
The decision in Green was clearly consistent with the con-
gressional intent underlying the Act which broadly proscribed
violence, even in the area of labor relations. But the powerful
precedent established by the Green case was not extensively ap-
plied in subsequent cases to labor violence situations. In fact, it
[employer] as aforesaid being then intended to be accomplished and accom-
plished with the consent of said [employer], induced and obtained by the
wrongful use, to wit, the use for the purposes aforesaid, of actual and threatened
force, violence and fear made to said [employer], and his employees and agents
then and there being; in violation of Section 1951 of Title 18, United States
Code."
Id. at 417.
60. The Court rendered its most accurate statement on the Hobbs Act ban on labor
violence, by stating:
Title I1 of the Hobbs Act provides that the provisions of the Act shall not affect
the Clayton Act, §§ 6 and 20. . .; the Norris-LaGuardia Act. . .; the Railway
Labor Act. . .; or the National Labor Relations Act. . . .There is nothing in
any of those Acts, however, that indicates any protection for unions or their
officials in attempts to get personal property through threats of force or violence.
Those are not legitimate means for improving labor conditions. If the trial court
intended by its references to the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts to indicate
any such labor exception, which we doubt, it was in error. Apparently what the
Court meant is more clearly expressed by its statement, . . . that the charged
acts would be criminal only if they were used to obtain property for the personal
benefit of the union or its agent, in this case Green. This latter holding is also
erroneous. The city truckers in the Local 807 case similarly were trying by force
to get jobs and pay from the out-of-state truckers by threats and violence. The
Hobbs Act was meant to stop just such conduct.
Id. at 419-20.
61. United States v. Green, 143 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Ill. 1956).
62. The lower court reviewed the record and found the following support for the
convictions:
The defendants did attempt by extortion to obtain from Mr. Terry the employ-
ment of superfluous labor on his machine. When Mr. Terry wanted to proceed
with his contract in March, 1953 and asked "What are you going to do then?"
Mr. Green replied according to his own testimony "Never you mind, I will stop
you." This in itself was a threat in violation of the Anti-Racketerring Act. . ..
Mr. Green's threat coupled with the display of at least 150 men on the scene of
the project when Mr. Terry's machine was stopped clinched the proof of the
Government on this issue. As defendants' counsel argues there was no actual
violence, but actual violence was not a necessary element of the crime.
Id. at 445; see United States v. Roth, 73 Lab. Cas. 14,394 (W.D.Pa. 1972), aff'd, 73 Lab.
Cas. 14,395 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 73 Lab. Cas. 14,456 (1974).
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was all but ignored by those courts deciding cases of labor viol-
ence after Green, even though the conduct involved in some of
these cases was strikingly similar to that involved in Green.
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Billingsley3 was con-
fronted with a Hobbs Act case not unlike the situation in Green.
In Billingsley the defendant was convicted "for forcing the hiring
of unwanted and superfluous workers by threatening a work
stoppage."64 Specifically, five unnecessary union ironworkers
were hired but they performed no work for the company and
otherwise acted in a manner inconsistent with their employ-
ment, e.g. by drinking before reporting to the job site. 5 The de-
fendant argued on appeal that the charge to the jury was in error
because it did not explain that the Hobbs Act prohibits only
labor demands which are solely motivated by an intent to com-
mit extortion." The court reviewed the trial court's charge"7 and
63. 474 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973).
64. There is a similar parallel between Local 807, supra note 90, and a recent case
heard before the NLRB. In Truck Drivers, Local 705, 210 N.L.R.B. 210 (1974), the NLRB
General Counsel presented evidence that the Truck Drivers, Local 705 in Chicago had
extorted money from a metropolitan Chicago service station. Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) Ohlbaum declared that the Local's "exclusive bargaining representation, recogni-
tion, membership and collection of dues" were a mere sham arrangement. The activities
were described by the judge as follows: "In a word, Respondent's activities here constitut-
ted sheer racketeering." Id. at 274. ALJ Ohlbaum imposed an unusually severe remedial
order on the Union by requiring the return to the station owners the money extorted, with
interest. The judge was so appalled at the testimony presented at the hearing that he
stated:
The flagrant, egregious, widespread, and corrupting nature of the pattern of
practices here provided mandates that they be referred to the attorney general
of the United States for appropriate action.
Id. at 277. See also, United States v. Jacobs, - F.2d __, 93 L.R.R.M. 2513 (7th Cir.
1976).
It is significant to note that the only remedies granted for the outrageous union
conduct in the Teamsters Local 705 decision were of a civil nature.
65. 474 F.2d at 64. The company's testimony of the facts was that the defendant, the
local union business agent, had demanded that the company hire five of the 12 ironworkers
he had brought with him that morning in addition to those already on the job, or he would
create a labor dispute which would shut the job down.
The defendant testified that five of the journeymen ironworkers should have been
hired because, with their greater experience, they would have provided greater safety to
the men working around the high tension electrical wires near the jobsite.
66. Id. at 65.
67. The charge given at trial stated:
[T]he principal issue before you is the intent with which the defendant threat-
ened to call a work stoppage. The government claims that it was done with the
intent and purpose of requiring the Mechem Company to put on and use un-
wanted and superfluous employees. The defendant claims that is what was done
for the purpose of achieving safety in the work operation. As I have already
22
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found it eminently fair since it satisfactorily considered the con-
cerns of both parties. The court explained:
Although the Appellant's requested instructions stated that le-
gitimate labor activities are not prohibited by the Hobbs Act,
it failed to state that the ramifications of legitimate labor activi-
ties could become unlawful. See U.S. v. Green, 246 F.2d 155, 160
(7th Cir. 1957), in which the Court refused to approve a similar
instruction that stated only that legitimate labor disputes were
not prohibited by the Hobbs Act. Our review of the record of this
case and the relevant authorities satisfies us that the Appellant
was not prejudiced by the court's refusal to give this instruc-
tion."8
The last case of labor violence which is considered is United
States v. Sweeney. 19 The Sweeney case is reminescent of the judi-
cial attitude exhibited in Teamsters Local 807.71 In Sweeney the
defendant, a union steward in Pittsburgh, demanded of a truck-
ing company representative that "union 'city men"' be used to
unload company trucks entering Pittsburgh. The defendant on
several occasions threatened the representative with personal in-
jury if the union demands were not met. Other evidence was
presented to show that Sweeney communicated his demands,
accompanied by threats, to company executives. Sweeney in-
sisted that the company agree to let Sweeney select the men who
would do the unloading, while also requiring a change in his com-
pensation and "instead of paying him at the rate of $17.80 a day
as agreed. . . he was to be paid $17.80 for every truck wholly or
partially unloaded.""
The court in Sweeney found the foregoing evidence sufficient
to constitute extortion under the Act."2 However, notwithstanding
indicated, the burden is upon the government to prove their claim, or theory,
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
68. Id.
69. 262-F.2d 272 (3d Cir.1959). See also United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994 (2d
Cir. 1971); United States v. Kennedy, 291 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1961). These last two cases
provide evidence that flagrant criminal conduct continued in a labor context even after
the public insisted that Congress discontinue it subsequent to the Teamsters Local 807
decision.
70. 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
71. 262 F.2d at 275.
72. The court stated that exacting "payment solely by wrongful use of fear of eco-
nomic loss is sufficient [to establish a violation] under the statute." Id. The cases of
Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1955) and United States v. Stirone, 262
F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1958) were also cited for this proposition. For further discussions of the
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Sweeney's obvious affiliation with the union, especially his ac-
tions in the capacity as a union representative, the court refused
to find that Sweeney was engaged in illegal union activity. Since
the agreement which Sweeney attempted to force upon the com-
pany was not one authorized or sanctioned by the union, the court
held that there was no exempted union activity.1
3
D. The "Fear Trilogy"
An essential element of a Hobbs Act violation is that the
person toward whom violence, or threats of violence, are directed
must be put in fear. Three cases establish the requisite principles
necessary to establish this element.
The leading case in this area is Bianchi v. United States.
1
The three defendants in Bianchi were labor representatives of the
different unions in the St. Louis area. These defendants con-
fronted the Trojan Construction Co. and expressed concern over
Trojan's plans to move its business into their area. The company
replied that the national agreements between the company and
the unions represented by the defendants, coupled with the com-
pany's use of union labor in the St. Louis area, was all that was
necessary for Trojan to do business there. The defendants replied
that these national agreements had no meaning to them. A week
later the work project was shutdown by a work stoppage. These
three defendants then met with company officials and stated that
the work stoppage would cease if Trojan paid to the defendants
three cents for every foot of pipe produced by the company. The
company acceded to this demand, and the defendants devised a
scheme whereby the payments "would be made in the form of
rental for fictitious equipment which would be neither furnished
nor used.""?
aforementioned point see note 74 and accompanying text infra. The court also noted that
in this case fear of personal injury was evidenced in addition to fear of economic loss.
Furthermore, the court concluded that under the statute extortion is committed even if
the extortionor did not receive the money or other value demanded. For a discussion of
this precedent see United States v. Green, 310 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1956) and United States
v. Kemble, 198 F.2d 889, 890 (3d Cir. 1952).
73. The Government presented three witnesses who testified that Sweeney commit-
ted violence against them. There was also evidence, however, that none of the three
witnesses were employed by, or related to, the extorted company. On this technicality the
court reversed and remanded Sweeney's case for a new trial on the ground that considera-
tion of this collateral evidence by the district court was prejudicial error. 262 F.2d at 277.
74. 219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955).
75. Id. at 187. The scheme was carried out by organizing a company in which the
defendants were allowed to function as company officers. The court found evidence that
this company existed only for the purpose of funneling payments to the defendants.
[Vol. 28
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Upon their conviction by the district court, the defendants
sought a reversal from the Eighth Circuit, contending that the
element of fear necessary to prove extortion was that of immedi-
ate "fear of physical violence or property damage,"7 and that
such fear did not exist in this case. They further argued that the
same requirement of fear under the robbery section of the Act
should also be applied in the extortion section of the Act. The
court rejected the defendants' arguments, concluding that extor-
tion and the requisite proof of fear accompanying it were to carry
their ordinary meanings and that fear of economic loss was a
sufficient basis for a charge of extortion under the Act.77
The court went on to expand its interpretation of the fear
question. Citing a pre-Hobbs Act case, United States v.
Compagna7 the court noted that "[t]he victims' fear [in
Compagna had] originated from acquaintance with the general
disorders and violence which had accompanied other strikes. '79
Thus, the court appeared to indicate that the extortionee's fear
can be grounded upon his knowledge of, and association with,
past labor strife.
The court thereafter determined from the record that the
jury could have inferred that the defendants and the work stop-
page at the construction site were inexorably linked because of
the evidence that labor problems ceased at the job site following
the payoff agreement. Although there had been no proof of any
actual violence to person or property, or of threats of such viol-
ence having been made to company officials, the question of
76. 219 F.2d at 188 (as opposed to the fear of financial loss present in this case).
77. The judges characterized robbery and extortion as distinct offenses. They further
stated that fear and its proof under the robbery section was stricter than under the
extortion offense. The court laid this point to rest by the following language: "We con-
clude that 'fear' as defined in the extortion section of the Anti-Racketeering Act should
be given its ordinary meaning, and consequently 'fear' would include fear of economic
loss." Id. at 189; accord, United States v. Dale, 223 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1955).
78. 146 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 867, reh'g denied, 325 U.S. 892
(1945).
79. 219 F.2d at 190. The Bianchi case presented another significant point. The court
recognized that the Hobbs Act does not hinder legitimate labor activities and does not
conflict with the Taft-Hartley Act, which prohibits noncompensatory payments to em-
ployee representatives. The Hobbs Act is broader and speaks in terms of money or prop-
erty demanded by threat or force.
Additionally, it has been held that once "fear" is created in the victim, it is continu-
ing in nature, and it may be proved that the fear created by the defendant continues
beyond the threats of force or use of actual force. But the fear, when instilled and if it
allegedly continues, must at all times be reasonable fear. United States v. Provenzano,
334 F.2d 678, 681 (3d Cir. 1964).
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whether fear was present was nonetheless properly submitted to
the jury. The court ruled that it was sufficient that "the basis
upon which the government claims the fear is created is defen-
dants' wrongful use of industrial strife and its threatened contin-
uation unless pay-off is made.""0
In United States v. Callanan,1 the court set forth an even
easier method for the finding of fear. The court stated:
It appears to us that the offense of extortion under the
Hobbs Act has been committed if the defendants have illegally
created fear in their victim, which fear has induced the victim
to part with his money or property. If the fear is created in the
victim for the purpose of extorting money or property, the of-
fense is present whether the defendants are responsible for any
past difficulties in the way of prior illegal strikes or unfair labor
practices which may have created the fear, or whether the fear
may have been created by what might have happened to others
in similar cases.
8 2
The Callanan decision allows a satisfactory finding of fear for a
Hobbs Act violation in the absence of direct threat or when the
only basis for fear is apprehension stemming from previous labor
problems in which the defendants were involved. "
Finally, the Second Circuit in United States v. Palmiottil4
laid to rest the doubts over what constitutes "fear" in the Hobbs
Act context when, recognizing the practicalities, it determined
the requisite fear was in fact the most easily satisfied element of
a Hobbs Act offense:
As to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellant's argument is
merely a variant of contentions we hear so often in extortion
cases to the effect that, unless the threat which induces fear in
the victim is spelled out in words of one syllable and in plain
terms of a threat, there is no case for the jury. But common
80. 219 F.2d at 195. The Bianchi case has been one of the most often cited cases
during the evolution of the Hobbs Act. It has generally been cited for its discussion of the
government's responsibility to prove fear in the extortionee as part of proof of the charge
asserted. The case establishes a firm foundation for subsequent cases on the government's
burden of proof in regard to the element of fear. It clearly demonstrates that this fear of
the extortionee may be based on a general knowledge of labor strife.
81. 223 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, reh'g denied, 353 U.S.
926 (1955).
82. Id. at 175.
83, Id. at 177-78.
84. 254 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1958).
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sense must be used in this class of cases as well as others. If the
jury believed Smykla's testimony of what appellant said to him,
it was certainly within their province to infer that appellant
intended to give Smykla the impression that he was faced with
the practical certainty that appellant would picket the job site
and cause a work stoppage if Symkla did not accede to his
demands. When appellant said 'there would be no trouble' on
the job if Smykla paid up, the jury had a right to infer that, if
Smykla did not pay up, there would be 'trouble,' and the 'trou-
ble' would be a shutting down of work on the job and financial
losses far in excess of the amounts demanded by appellant.
Indeed, it is not unlikely that the sort of language used by appel-
lant in this case is more or less typical of that used in the com-
mon garden variety of labor shakedown that is now so frequently
disclosed in the criminal cases in the Southern District of New
York. Not only do we find the evidence sufficient to support the
charge, but we also are of the opinion that the inference of a
shutdown or strike unless Smykla submitted to appellant's
demands was all but compelling, provided the jury believed
Smykla. It is quite immaterial whether or not appellant actually
had the power to picket the job and close it down."5
It seemed, through these opinions, that the courts finally
recognized that violence or fear of violence aroused by organized
labor was, in far more cases than not, the fuel for labor discord.
The cases at last finally seemed to flow again in the congression-
ally intended direction so that violence in a labor relations con-
85. Id. at 495-96 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the courts have held that evidence
of a defendant's "bad reputation" is admissible to aid the jury in evaluating whether the
defendant created reasonable fear in the victim. In United States v. Billingsley the court,
adhering to precedent, determined:
We have considered the appellant's contentions, and the decisions of the
Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits and we find that the reasoning of these
decisions is the more persuasive. These deicisons rest upon the fact that extor-
tion is an essential element of the Hobbs Act and to prove extortion, it is
essential to show that there was a generation of fear in the victim. The reasona-
bleness of actual or anticipated fear is a vital element in these cases, and the
reputation of the defendant therefore becomes relevant since such a reputation
frequently conveys a tacit threat of violence. Accordingly, the reputation of the
defendant is admissible not to show that he was a bad man and likely to commit
crime, but to indicate that the threats of the defendant were not idle. We agree
with the other circuits which have considered this question and hold that the
evidence of the bad reputation of the defendant is admissible for the limited
purpose of showing the fear and its reasonableness caused by the threats of the
defendant.
474 F.2d at 66; accord, United States v. Stubbs, 476 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Dale, 223 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1955).
1976]
27
Willis: Labor Violence--The Judiciary's Refusal to Apply the Hobbs Act
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
text would be halted. However, no sooner did this flow begin
when it was diverted by the decisions of United States v. Caldes88
and United States v. Enmons.87
IV. JUDICIAL REFUSAL TO OUTLAW LABOR VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS
OF Caldes AND Enmons
To the despair of a public which abhors criminal violence
and to the despair of the 78th and 79th Congresses, whose legisla-
tive intent is clear from the records, the judiciary has been deter-
mined to thwart public and legislative directions by ignoring the
Hobbs Act's mandate to halt labor violence. This public frustra-
tion is caused by the courts' insistence upon distinguishing be-
tween the Green case's "unwanted" employees and "wanted"
employees as originally qualified in Green, particularly where
labor and management may be negotiating a collective bargain-
ing agreement. The Caldes and Enmons cases illustrate this judi-
cial refusal to apply the Act.
A. United States v. Caldes
The defendants in this case were Caldes, an AFL-CIO repre-
sentative, and Lowery, president of Local 369, Laundry and Dry-
cleaning International Union. The union and the Mission Linen
Supply Company were involved in contract negotiations at the
time of the violent incidents which subsequently became the
basis of the indictments and lower court convictions of Caldes
and Lowery. The two incidents of violence/property destruction
occurred when Lowery and Caldes damaged some of the
company's linen with green dye. The central issue faced by the
appellate court was whether the Hobbs Act prohibited violence
to property as a part of a union's plan to extort a collective bar-
gaining agreement covering wanted employees. The Ninth Cir-
cuit answered in the negative, and reversed the lower court deci-
sion on
the ground that the Act was not intended to reach low level
violence committed in connection with bona fide labor disputes
between employers and employees. In this, we try to carefully
distinguish this case from one in which acts of extortion were
committed to compel an employer to take on unwanted workers
86. 457 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1972).
87. 410 U.S. 396 (1972).
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(featherbedding) or to pay for work which the worker has no
intention of performing."8
In an attempt to justify this reversal, the court examined the
Local 80719 case and the legislative history of the Hobbs Act.
Ignoring the intent behind the Hobbs Act, the court erroneously
determined that it was not Congress' intention in eliminating
§ 2(a) of the Anti-Racketeering Act by the Hobbs Act, to prohibit
militant labor activity in seeking "legitimate labor objectives." In
addition, the court examined the Kemble case" as a significant
judicial interpretation of what the Congress had in mind in the
Hobbs Act but considered that the Kemble decision should be
narrowly applied to the situation involved in the case before the
court.' The court framed the question in a most self-serving man-
ner:
We turn to the question - did Congress intend to impose a
felony conviction with severe penalties upon the union member
caught in such byplay while trying to gain larger wages or better
working hours and conditions for wanted employees? Certainly
this conduct would constitute an offense against the state and
would properly be described as a unfair labor practice.9"
In concluding such was not intended by Congress, the court
relied on People v. Dioguardi93 to establish the state appellate
court's own construction of its state penal code, from which the
Hobbs Act's definition of "extortion" was originally taken. How-
ever, on its face, the Dioguardi decision does not support the
Kemble court but instead is unequivocally opposed to the
Kemble court position. Dioguardi had extorted money from a
company to end a peaceful organizational picketing situation.
The New York court's opinion plainly states that the lawful,
88. 457 F.2d at 75-76. The court noted: "Our research has not led to the discovery of
another federal appellate court that has addressed itself to this issue, but a recent district
court case seems not inconsistent with our conclusions." Id. at 76 citing United States v.
Enmons, 335 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. La. 1971).
89. 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
90. 198 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1952).
91. The Green, Callanan, and Sweeney cises were all distinguished in the Caldes
case. The court distinguished Green from the instant case because in Green there was
sought, by means of extortion, "unwanted and superfluous [employees] or ficticious
services." The Callanan and Sweeney cases were distinguished on the grounds that in
those cases "extortion occurred when a union member tried to foist himself, or another
union member, on an employer by threats of force and violence." 457 F.2d at 77.
92. Id.
93. 8 N.Y.2d 260, 168 N.E.2d 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1960).
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peaceful character of the picketings was abruptly "changed from
legality to criminality, however, when it was used as a pressure
device to exact the payment of money as a condition of its cessa-
tion." 4 The principle founded in Dioguardi is that labor activity
initially recognized as lawful under the NLRA and other labor
laws becomes unlawful when it is attempted to be, or is forced
upon an employer through violence, whether picketing, striking
or other means are used to bring unlawful pressure upon the
employer. Congress also intended to establish this principle in the
Hobbs Act.
The Caldes court, in further attempting to justify its rever-
sal, took still another indefensible position when it concluded:
If the Hobbs Act was construed to cover acts of violence during
the negotiations for a legitimate labor goal we see a further
danger that it would permit a union member to be found guilty
of extortion for mischievous conduct even though he did not
possess the requisite felonious intent to deprive another of his
property."5
What the court conveniently overlooked is the fact that when
such a union member resorts to violence, he then becomes pos-
sessed with the "requisite felonious intent" sufficient to consti-
tute a violation of the Hobbs Act.
The court obviously concluded that the Act was not intended
to constitute such a weapon against labor. This conclusion illus-
trates the judiciary's refusal to enforce the Act, in part due to
labor's powerful influence on the enforcement of the laws in this
country. The Caldes court, as so many courts before it, including
the Supreme Court in its Enmons decision, apparently did not
see, or would not accept, that the true intent of Congress was to
curtail labor violence. 6 The Caldes court expressed the further
concern that the Hobbs Act could be unwarrantedly expanded to
proscribe mere minor acts of violence, thus creating an extraordi-
nate number of prosecutions. This concern is unfounded. The
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof placed on the
94. Id. at 271, 168 N.E.2d at 690-91, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
95. 457 F.2d at 78.
96. The legislative history of the Act demonstrates conclusively that Congress, in
passing the Hobbs Act, demanded what the Caldes court rejected with the following
statement: "The expansive interpretation of 'extortion' used in the Hobbs Act as urged
by the Government would make criminal the activities of many militant labor organiza-
tions." 457 F.2d at 78.
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government would dissuade the prosecution of insignificant in-
stances of violence. Furthermore, it was hoped that the local and
state authorities would become more responsive to their own laws
and prosecute these minor incidents themselves. 7 Only federal
enforcement of the Hobbs Act, as ordered by its statutory terms
and legislative history, will curtail the use of violence and fear by
labor unions to achieve their "legitimate labor objectives."
B. United States v. Enmons
Inasmuch as the arguments levied against the Caldes deci-
sion parallel many of the issues discussed by the Supreme Court
in their Enmons opinion, Enmons will not be put to the same
detailed scrutiny as previously given those arguments. Instead,
the following analysis of Enmons will focus upon those points
treated by the Court which highlight the majority's error and
which seem purposefully to ignore the Act's legislative history.
In order that the issues which reached the Supreme Court
will be framed in context, the lower court's treatment of the case
must initially be examined. Briefly stated, the Hobbs Act indict-
ment against these defendants involved labor violence much
more severe than that in the Caldes case. 8 The alleged unlawful
conduct occurred during a strike which stemmed from a contract
dispute between the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers and the Gulf States Utilities Corporation.
Recognizing the precedent presented by Green, the district
court admitted throughout that had these acts of violence oc-
curred in conjunction with a union attempting to force unwanted
97. The Caldes court itself recognized that state and local laws were ineffectively
enforced. Yet the court's approach in the case does not make sense. The court first
established that it seemed "that acts of vandalism of the type committed by these appel-
lants would be more properly and suitably prosecuted in the state courts ... " Id. at 79.
Yet the court had just previously recounted that the defendants "were labor leaders who
were seen on two instances committing acts of vandalism against Mission's property of
the type that could logically be inferred as getting a message' to the company that if it
did not settle, the level of violence might escalate ...
A malicious mischief report was filed with local police but no charges were
instituted in state court." Id. at 75.
98. The conduct allegedly in violation of the Act was described in the brief filed in
the case:
It'was also alleged that, in furtherance of the conspiracy, appellees, or
persons acting at their direction, committed five acts of violence against the
property of Gulf States Uitilities including the shooting and sabotage of trans-
formers and the blowing up of a transformer substation.
Brief for Appellant at 4, United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1972).
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or superfluous services upon an employer, they would have clearly
constituted a violation of the Hobbs Act. The court refused, how-
ever, to accept the Government's contention that the definition
of "property" under the Hobbs Act includes either "higher wages
sought by collective bargaining, [or], the Company's 'right to
negotiate' the wage questions without unlawful interference.""9
As a further basis of its opinion, the court recognized that there
was no question that the strike itself was legal or that the efforts
of the union to secure higher wages from the employer were law-
ful.
In the legislative history of the Hobbs Act there is language
sufficiently broad to encompass the Government's contentions in
this case. However, the district court found only the judicial pre-
cedent in Green on record, which restricted the Hobbs Act terms
of "extortion" and "property" to those efforts by unions to force
unwanted services upon employers. The district court accordingly
took the easy way out and did not accept the Government's broad
definition of property.' 0 Confronted directly with these critical
99. 335 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D. La. 1971). The district court found no judicial preced-
ent to support the Government's contention. Thecourt held:
It is the opinion of this Court that neither the wages of bonafide employees
nor the "right to negotiate employment contracts-without illegal disruption"
constitute "property" as contemplated by the Hobbs Act. The union had a right
to disrupt the business of the employer by lawfully striking for higher wages.
Acts of violence occurring during a lawful strike and resulting in damage to
persons or property are undoubtedly punishable under State law. To punish
persons for such acts of violence was not the purpose of the Hobbs Act. . . .But
these acts simply did not constitute the 'obtaining of property from another'
that is contemplated by the Hobbs Act.
Id. at 646. The district court also recognized, however, that there exists inferences in the
legislative history to support the Government's contentions.
100. The Government's argument puts the lower court's inadequate reasoning in
perspective:
Yet [after recognizing under the Hobbs Act that violent conduct is present when
a union tries to obtain wages for unwanted services the lower court] then held
that the very same conduct-or worse-cannot be reached under the Hobbs Act
so long as such violence during a bona fide labor dispute is directed simply at
securing higher wages for existing employees holding down necessary jobs. This
distinction between services that are wanted and those that are unwanted finds
no support in the language of the statute or its legislative background. It is,
moreover, at odds with the essential thrust of this Court's decision in U.S. v.
Green, 350 U.S. 415. Congress did not intend that extortion to achieve higher
wages be treated differently from extortion to achieve featherbedding; the
statute was designed to outlaw both.
Brief for the Appellants at 6, United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
Additional arguments by the Government in its brief to the Court were that whether
the higher wages are for services unwanted or wanted makes no distinguishable difference.
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issues, a rare opportunity was thus presented to the Supreme
Court to fulfill the Congressional mandates enunciated 30 years
ago.'0' Unfortunately, the Court chose to ignore those mandates.
Since the beginning of time, under all laws, common and
civil, the taking of another's property by force, with or without
his consent, has been termed and dealt with as a crime. Yet for
purposes of the Hobbs Act, the Court has restricted the criminal
definition of "wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence
or fear"'0 2 to "those instances where the obtaining of the property
would itself be 'wrongful' because the alleged extortionist has no
lawful claims to that property,' ' 0 3 and not where unlawful viol-
ence has been used to gain legitimate union objectives, such as
services or higher wages.
In both cases the employer is subjected to unlawful violent acts and fear to accede to the
union's demands. Moreover, the Government compared the lawful collective bargaining
process with the unlawful attempts to accomplish the same lawful collective bargaining
ends through violence and threats. In this comparison the Government used the legislative
history to accurately demonstrate that in the Congress' refusal to limit the terms of the
Hobbs Act, the protection originally afforded to labor was totally eliminated. Therefore,
the wrongful use of force to achieve illegitimate ends was proscribed, as well as the
unlawful use of force and threats to achieve legitimate ends. In summary, the Government
contended that the extortion by acts of violence, as a means of obtaining higher wages
and other monetary benefits, as occurred in the case at hand, was prohibited by the Hobbs
Act. It was further argued that this type of violence was just as criminal under the Hobbs
Act when committed in the context of a labor dispute as when committed in any other
context. The Government concluded their brief by stating that "[tihe facts pleaded in
this indictment reflect the precise evil which the intentionally broad language of the
statute intended to proscribe." Brief for Appellant at 21, United States v. Enmons, supra.
The Government's Brief also argued that the Congressional response to the Court's
decision in the Local 807 case was a broad rather than restrictive definition of prohibited
conduct. The Government astutely pointed out that the Court in the Local 807 case looked
solely to the objective (the payment of "wages") that the union sought to achieve, rather
than focus on the unlawful means (the use of force and violence) used to attain the
otherwise lawful objective. The Government submitted that the definition of extortion
covers all unlawful attempts to gain property, whether that property be a lawful or unlaw-
ful objective: "But when the union 'demands' are accompanied by the 'wrongful use of
force, violence, or fear', those demands cease to be legitimate labor activity and become
extortionate conduct within the meaning of the statute." Appellant's Reply Brief at 5,
United States v. Enmons, supra.
101. The Court recognized that conduct arguably proscribed by the Act was infre-
quently prosecuted by the federal authorities. Two particular arguments may be advanced
to explain these infrequent prosecutions. First, it may be argued that powerful labor
lobbies have thwarted and discouraged prosecutions or secondly, the reluctance of the
courts to convict offenders under the Hobbs Act may be argued to have discouraged the
bringing of charges under the Act. See United States v. DeLaurentis, 491 F.2d 208, 212
(2d Cir. 1974).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1970).
103. 410 U.S. at 400.
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In . . . [a] case [where legitimate union objectives are
sought], there [would be] no 'wrongful' taking of the em-
ployer's property; he [would have] paid for the services he
bargained for, and the workers [would have received] the wages
to which they [would be] entitled in compensation for their
services.'
Reduced to simple terms, the Court simply chose to ignore the
elementary and fundamental distinction between a situation
where one parts with his property by being illegally forced to do
so by violence against his person or property and where one parts
with his property because of lawful pressures upon him to do so.
With this initial determination made, although contradicted
by age-old criminal law precedent, the Court laboriously ferretted
out what few comments in the Hobbs Act's legislative history it
could upon which to base its disregard for the Congressional man-
date."" If the Court's interpretation of the Hobbs Act's legislative
history is accepted, then the Hobbs Act does nothing more than
limitedly apply the Anti-Racketeering Act to the Local 807 situa-
tion.'00
Having now grappled with the Act's legislative history, the
Court turned in further disregard for the Act's effect to the two
leading case precedents which were unfavorable to the Court's
position here, Green'"' and Kemble.'05 The Court seized upon the
limiting language of these cases (as is typical of the large majority
of sensitive Supreme Court and Circuit decisions) to dismiss
those cases out-of-hand, along with the Government's legisla-
104. Id.
105. The Enmons court was clear on this point, although the conclusions were
reached by unreasonable disregard for the legislative intent:
The legislative framework of the Hobbs Act dispels any ambiguity in the word-
ing of the statute and makes it clear that the Act does not apply to the use of
force to achieve legitimate labor ends ...
Id. at 401.
106. See generally id. at 402-08. The Court totally misconstrued the legislative his-
tory. The fear was raised that an expanded application of the Act would result in federal
prosecutions of insignificant violent conduct. The court referred to an exchange in the
legislative debates between Representatives Marcantonio and Hobbs. In that exchange,
Representative Marcantonio asked whether a simple assault during a strike could violate
the Hobbs Act. Hobbs denied that such an incident would violate the Act so as to subject
the assaultor and his union to liability under the Act. The Court in Enmons expanded
this response to support their conclusion that any violence in an attempt to achieve lawful
objectives is without the Act's proscriptions. See id. at 405.
107. United States v, Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
108. United States v. Kemble, 198 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1952).
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tively supported challenges to the Court's head-long rush to af-
firm the lower Enmons court." 9 The majority's conclusion is
concise:
[M]t would require statutory language much more explicit than
that before us here to lead to the conclusion that Congress in-
tended to put the Federal Government in the business of polic-
ing the orderly conduct of strikes. Neither the language of the
Hobbs Act nor its legislative history can justify the conclusion
that Congress intended to work such an extraordinary change in
federal labor law or such an unprecedented incursion into the
criminal jurisdiction of the States."'
But as argued in this article, such a conclusion is unsupported by
the Act's legislative history and those few cases where the jurists
have faced the clear mandates of Congress and the statute itself.
Justice Douglas registered a scathing dissent but did not take
full advantage of the legislative history of the Act as enunciated
by the 78th Congress. Douglas drew his support from less strong
statements of the 79th Congress. Nevertheless, he did not avoid
or ignore his judicial responsibility and, at last, though unfortun-
ately in dissent, addressed himself to the heart of the matter:
Seeking higher wages is certainly not unlawful. But using viol-
ence to obtain them seems plainly within the scope of "extor-
tion" as used in the Act, just as is the use of violence to exact
payment for no work or the use of violence to get a sham substi-
tution for no work. The regime of violence, whatever its precise
objective, is a common device of extortion and is condemned by
the Act.
Whatever may be thought of the policy which the Court
today embroiders into the Act, it was the minority view in the
House and clearly did not represent the consensus of the House.
No light is thrown on the matter by the Senate, for it summarily
approved the House version of the bill.
It is easy in these insulated chambers to put an attractive
gloss on an Act of Congress if five votes can be obtained. At
109. The Court, it should be noted, cited Caldes as supporting precedent.
110. 410 U.S. at 411. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, explained how the
majority expected this violence to be controlled:
This type of violence, as the Court points out, is subject to state criminal
prosecution. That is where it must remain until the Congress acts otherwise in
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times, the legislative history of a measure is so clouded or ob-
scure that we must perforce give some meaning to vague words.
But where, as here, the consensus of the House is so clear, we
should carry out its purpose no matter how distasteful or unde-
sirable that policy may be to us, unless of course the Act over-
steps constitutional boundaries. But none has been so hardy as
even to suggest that.
While we said in Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517,
522, that it is "retrospective expansion of meaning which pro-
perly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation," the same is
true of retrospective contraction of meaning.
I would reverse."'
V. CONCLUSION
As is self-evident throughout this article, I too join Justices
Douglas, Burger, Powell and Rehnquist in urging reversal not
only of the Supreme Court's decision in Enmons, but of all of
these cases in which the judiciary has neglected the unmistakable
directives of Congress. Reduced to its essential form, with few
exceptions, this case law, which is the only form through which
the courts speak, refuses to prohibit violence via the Congression-
ally enacted tool for such purpose-the Hobbs Act. The Enmons
decision affirms this judicial disregard of the Act.
Notwithstanding the efforts of the courts to reduce the Act's
instructions (as defined by the legislative history) to outlaw labor
violence to meaningless verbiage, they still remain on the face of
the Congressional Record, although tarnished considerably by
this onslaught of judicial misconstruction over some thirty years.
In view of Enmons, any flow now toward judicial recognition of
the basic thrust of the Act seems most unlikely.
As has traditionally been the result where one branch of our
three branch system of governmental democracy has erred, one
of the other branches reacts to correct such error generally in
accord with the expressions of the public. Whether Congress will
once again act in reaction to a Supreme Court decision revolving
around labor dispute violence, now Enmons, yesterday Teamsters
Local 807, is the significant question awaiting resolution today.1
2
From this point of view, there is no basis in the Act's statu-
111. Id, at 418-19.
112. Representative Anderson of Illinois, responding to Enmons, has proposed to
amend the Hobbs Act to more broadly prohibit labor violence. See 83 L.R.R.M. 161.
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tory terms or legislative history to support or explain the evolu-
tion of its meaning through case law developments over the last
30 years. The courts continue to permit labor violence to continue
unabated. And so, following the careful and detailed analysis of
all of the pertinent factors as aforesaid, one is left with only the
inexorable conclusion that the judiciary has ignored the true pur-
pose of the Hobbs Act. "Est autem vis legem sinulans."11
113. Violence may also put on the mask of law.
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